News 45 years since Soyuz-1 disaster

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On April 23, 1967, Vladimir Komarov has been killed when parachute of his return capsule failed to deploy on descent. Along with then recent death of Korolyov, this event has rendered futile all further efforts of the USSR to regain leadership in the Moon race against the USA at that time. Today it still serves as a reminder of the great risk which is associated with human spaceflight.

Nobody should stay silent,
Keeping words for another turn.
We know the scale of our daring,
We know where we go.
The nerves are humming as strings,
The heart is echoing pain...
It's almost beyond possibility
To get our future obtained!
But still, let cherry trees blossom,
Let rocket engines roar!
The more the stars become closer,
The stronger the cause of Komarov!

Robert Rozhdestvensky
 
[ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perpetual_beta"]Bananaware[/ame] should have no place in manned spaceflight.
 
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In unmanned spaceflight it's undesirable as well, as PhG taught us.

Yeah, but it caused much less harm there. You can tolerate a bit of flight testing on unmanned vehicles, but on manned vehicles, the essential functions have to be reliable regardless what happens to payload systems.
 
the best theory I remember about the fatal part of the flight, was that the parachute containers had been designed without taking the compression due to internal pressure of the cabin into account, which explained why the parachutes worked on the not really successful test flights - in which the capsule had been decompressed.
 
the best theory I remember about the fatal part of the flight, was that the parachute containers had been designed without taking the compression due to internal pressure of the cabin into account, which explained why the parachutes worked on the not really successful test flights - in which the capsule had been decompressed.

Isn't the decent module vented after the the reentry? Or did the pressure permanently change the shape of the containers? [EDIT]That would explain the change from cylindrical to conical containers.[/EDIT]

I've heard about the "hammering the parachutes to make it fit" but if it's folded correctly that shouldn't make such a big difference. Today we use hydraulic presses to fold everything from airbags to recovery chutes.
 
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Isn't the decent module vented after the the reentry? Or did the pressure permanently change the shape of the containers?

The pressure equalisation valve is used after main parachute was deployed and long after the drogue chute. The inside of Soyuz still had the standard atmosphere in it (sea-level pressure)

A bit of the pressure difference should be permanent, but that was not the big cause, rather the difference between 9 km altitude after ejecting the parachute container hatch and 0 km altitude.

I am not sure if hamming the main parachute into position was really a problem or had been even a standard operation.
 
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That flight encountered failures after failures. Only Komarov piloting skills allowed the spacecraft to reenter on a safe angle, and he did that while all the attitude control instruments went down. But sadly, that wasn't enough.

:salute:
 
It's really sad that a man died, but sometimes you have to do mistakes to learn from them and improve your spacecraft (Just think of the shuttle disasters).
But the Sowiets/Russians could be proud that this spacecraft design is in service for 45 years without any fatal accidents since 40 years:thumbup:
 
It's really sad that a man died, but sometimes you have to do mistakes to learn from them and improve your spacecraft (Just think of the shuttle disasters).
But the Sowiets/Russians could be proud that this spacecraft design is in service for 45 years without any fatal accidents since 40 years:thumbup:

Yep, but a new type of manned spacecraft is under development right now. I think it's best to remember the lessons once learnt the hard way.
 
Yes, and in the Soyuz-1 case, it was a striking exemple of a rushed mission. The hardware was not ready, and they knew it. It was criminal to assign Komarov on that flight, that should have been unmanned.

And that tragic error vanished any hope for the Soviet Union to win the Moon Race, as Soyuz had to be seriously re-engineered (removal of the solar panels, etc...).

Even Apollo 1 is slightly different : that tragedy was more caused by a misconception, which consisted to think "as long as it is a ground test, we can act quickly if things go wrong, so the astronauts are safe".
 
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Comrade Komarov will forever be remembered as one of the bravest explorers :salute:!
 
the best theory I remember about the fatal part of the flight, was that the parachute containers had been designed without taking the compression due to internal pressure of the cabin into account, which explained why the parachutes worked on the not really successful test flights - in which the capsule had been decompressed.

This was the official conclusion on the reasons of the disaster. But there was a test performed that commission wasn't aware of. Spacecraft assembly team tried to find the force needed for drogue chute to make the main chute to deploy. They took the Soyuz-2 (which was intended to be launched the day after Soyuz-1), hooked its drogue chute by crane and started to pull it up. They found that the entire mass of the Soyuz capsule wasn't enough to make the main chute to get out of the container. Chute container wasn't even deformed.
That's why the version by Boris Chertok seems more reliable. I'll quote the part of the article C3PO posted link to.

Boris Chertok had a different theory. In his memoirs, he explained that the Soyuz spacecraft were covered in a thermal protectant polymer, a glue-like substance that was sealed onto the vehicle in an autoclave. When Komarov’s spacecraft was put in the autoclave, the parachute pack was uncovered — this one piece of the assembly was unfinished. The polymer could have easily seeped into the open parachute pack, gluing the chute closed. The test spacecraft weren’t put through the autoclave, so this problem wouldn’t have developed during testing.

This described in details in Chertocks' memoirs I'm reading right now.


EDIT: Hmmm. I checked the same book's chapter in the NASA published edition and found that insertion:

After the first edition of this book was published, I received criticism from a former shop No. 1 process engineer regarding the scenario alleging that volatile fractions of the polymerized coating precipitated on the interior surface of the parachute container.
“We carefully covered the containers or used flight lids. The scenario about the parachute getting ‘glued down’ should be thrown out.”
Eduard Ivanovich Korzhenevskiy was still alive, and I thought I needed to consult with him once again.
“Yes, there was such a scenario,” he said. “But my opinion is that the parachute was so severely jammed into the cramped, rough container that no additional adhesion was required.”

:shrug:
 
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Yeah, that is the problem there. But since the redesign of the parachute containers fixed it, I suspect that the official conclusion was at least successful enough, since there had never been parachute failures again.

I don't know about the crane test there, never heard of it, but the parachutes did deploy on the unmanned test flights, with the same containers. What ever caused it, it must have been a really small detail, like a slightly bigger force acting on the parachute packs over the whole area of the container.
 
Well, Chetok have an explaination regarding chutes of unmanned ships. All unmanned Soyuzes was assembled with violation of the assembly chart because of lack of time, that's why chute containers wasn't installed prior of polymer coverage.
Manned ships was a different matter, they had to do everything by paper. Chute containers was installed before coverage. Don't know about container lids though. Chertok says they weren't there, but he wasn't the person responsible for chutes directly. Aforementioned engineer said they was. Oh well, anyway chute containers was redesigned in many ways, not only by hardening.

Chertok's memoirs are literally the story of soviet space failures (and victories too, of course) with so much details. Some failure causes seems ludicrous.
 
Hardening alone wouldn't have done it anyway, correct me if I am wrong, but the aren't the parachute containers pressurized to cabin pressure to save weight?
 
Hardening alone wouldn't have done it anyway, correct me if I am wrong, but the aren't the parachute containers pressurized to cabin pressure to save weight?

In the present day's design, they are pressurized, but pressurized independently of the main cabin's volume.
http://files.baumanec.net/botva/10%...8%f1%f2%e5%ec%e0%20%d1%c0%20%d1%ee%fe%e7.docx

Both containers are designed to withstand the cabin's pressure even in the case their own internal pressure is lost. They are also designed to preserve stability and strength in scenario when the cabin's pressure is lost and the container's pressure is preserved.
 
He says nothing about saving weight. It seems that containers was pressurized to 1 atm just because they've been sealed, well, with the outer air perssure of 1 atm. Like no special terms was specified for containers internal pressure.

The body of the descent module housed two containers for the parachute system,
which were in the form of elliptical cylinders. The larger of the two was intended for
the main parachute system and the smaller—for the backup system.
The parachute bundles are pushed with great force into the cramped
containers after the entire descent module has undergone heat treatment in a
special autoclave at a temperature of several hundred degrees to polymerize the
thermal protective coating. Before this, the openings of the empty containers
must be covered with flight lids since, being part of the exterior surface of
the descent module, they have the same thermal protective coating. During
descent, upon reaching an external pressure that corresponds to an altitude of
9.5 kilometers, a special pressure unit issues the commands to jettison the lid
of the main parachute system (OSP). After the parachutes are packed and
the lids closed, the containers are airtight and normal atmospheric pressure is
maintained inside them. When the container lids are jettisoned, the internal
pressure [of the container] drops abruptly to the value corresponding to an
altitude of 9.5 kilometers. The internal pressure of the descent module, which is
close to 1 atmosphere, acts on the body of the container. Because of the pressure
differential, compressive force acts over the entire surface of the container. The
jettisoned lid sweeps the drogue parachutes into the main stream; these, in
turn, pull out the braking parachute. The timing mechanism counts down a
delay of 17 seconds needed for the braking parachute to balloon open and
decelerate the descent module to the designated descent speed. Responding to
the command issued after 17 seconds, the braking parachute begins to pull the
bundle containing the main parachute out of the container. After the canopy of
the main parachute enters the stream, the braking parachute flies away with the
bag in which the main parachute was stowed.
...
The Soyuz landing system underwent thorough testing at the Air Force firing
range near Feodosiya. Descent module mockups with standard parachute systems
and our standard automatics were dropped from airplanes five times. We studied all
the glitches that occurred during these drops and modified the systems repeatedly.
Finally, we had the experience of landing the two previous 7K-OKs. Vehicle No.
1 (Kosmos-133) landed successfully using the ZSP when the emergency recovery
system was actuated, and vehicle No. 3 (Kosmos-140) came down onto the ice of the
Aral Sea, and there were no complaints about its parachute system.
...
On impact with the ground, there was an explosion and a fire started. The
descent module tanks still contained around 30 kilograms of concentrated
hydrogen peroxide, which had served as the gas for the guided reentry system
engines. It doesn’t just burn; it expedites the combustion of anything that
isn’t burning by giving off free oxygen as it breaks down. Due to the off-
nominal high rate of descent, rather than being jettisoned at an altitude of 3
kilometers, the front shield was jettisoned right at ground level. The command
to power up the gamma-ray altimeter was not executed, and consequently, the
command to start up the soft landing engines was not issued either. Impact
with the ground was so violent that the depression that was formed was more
than a half-meter deep. Local residents were the first to arrive at the crash site.
They tried to smother the fire by throwing dirt on it. When the helicopters
of the search and rescue service landed, fire extinguishers were used. When
Kamanin arrived, he demanded before all else that they search for what
remained of Komarov. His burnt remains were immediately sent to Orsk.
The main parachute was melted inside the container. The drogue, braking,
and backup parachutes were intact.
...
According to the commission’s findings, the most probable cause of the
main parachute’s failure to deploy was the insufficient force of the braking
parachute. Because the main parachute system’s braking parachute had
not been jettisoned, it created an aerodynamic shielding effect preventing
the backup parachute’s canopy from opening up. The possibility of their
simultaneous operation had not been looked at before. The commission
explained that the reason for the insufficient force of the braking parachute
was that, due to the pressure differential, the OSP container had deformed
and constricted the parachute bundle so that the amount of force needed to
pull it out of the container was significantly greater than the pull generated
by the braking parachute. When asked why this hadn’t been noticed during
all the developmental testing drops, the responses were not very convincing.
Regarding 7K-OK vehicle No. 3 (Kosmos-140), there had been no pressure
differential, since after the bottom of the descent module burned through,
the spacecraft had depressurized. During the work of the commissions, they
were unable to provide a convincing explanation for the normal operation of
the OSP during test drops from airplanes.
 
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