So the Proton could be grounded for months ? :shifty:
The Failure Review Oversight Board (FROB) concluded the review of the Russian State Commission report on September 11 concerning the root cause of the Russian Federal Telkom-3/Express MD-2 mission failure which occurred on August 7. The FROB agreed with the Russian State Commission that the root cause of the failure was due to a component of the pressurization system that was not manufactured to specifications. This caused a shutdown of the Breeze M Main engine by the Breeze M flight control system 7 seconds into the planned 18 minute and 5 second 3rd burn.
The corrective action plan for all Breeze M upper stages that was established by the Russian State Commission and Khrunichev State Research and Space Production Center (KhSC) was also approved by the FROB. This includes stringent quality oversight of all rework procedures, testing, support equipment, and personnel, both at the KhSC production facilities and in Baikonur. In addition, ILS and KhSC will develop specific initiatives to enhance the unified Quality Management System (QMS) that is installed and operating at all KhSC production facilities.
.......
Briefing reporters here during the World Satellite Business Week conference organized by Euroconsult, McKenna said a Russian government commission looking into the Aug. 6 failure, which left Russian and Indonesian telecommunications satellites in useless orbits, has clearly identified the failure’s cause and remedial action.
The Breeze-M upper stage failed to deliver sufficient thrust on the third of its planned ignitions because of a small metallic orifice inside a fuel line that was not manufactured according to specifications, McKenna said.
The component was built by Polyot of Omsk, Russia, in a manufacturing plant owned by Khrunichev Space Center of Moscow, which is Proton’s prime contractor and for the last several years has assembled most Proton subcontractors under its management.
McKenna said the defective pressurization-line component was built by Khrunichev until 2011, when it was moved to Polyot in 2011 as part of a general reorganization of Proton assembly.
The Polyot-built component has flown on several flights without failing, a fact that McKenna said helps explain why the defect, which he said was due to a misunderstanding at Polyot of how the part should be built, escaped Polyot and Krunichev review tests.
Given that the defect only occurred at certain pressure thresholds, McKenna said, it was not picked up as the component was tested with Khrunichev oversight.
.........
A (very basic) quality control issue :blink:
Even a graduate engineer knows about that...
You might let people know who are interested in such things that for the
last 3 days I've been investigating a major satellite break-up with well-known
astronomer Rob McNaught. The event occurred on 16 October when Rob,
as part of his regular near-earth asteroid survey work, serendipitously
observed dozens of fragments passing through his very narrow field of
view telescope (Siding Spring Observatory, New South Wales, Australia).
Based on his astrometry, I positively identified the culprit as the
Breeze-M R/B upper stage that was supposed to launch Telkom 3 and
Express MD2 into GEO back in August (USSPACECOM #38746). Rob
observed over 70 individual fragments moving in mostly parallel
orbits that matched the location (to within 0.5 degrees cross-track),
direction and velocity that #38746 ~should~ have had, except that most
of the fragments showed up about 5 minutes early. A subsequent
targeted search for #38746 one day later by Rob (cued by me) turned
up nothing, adding confidence to the identification.
Given that this Breeze-M rocket body was nearly full of fuel (it shut down
after only a 7-second burn, stranding the two satellites in useless orbits),
it is not that surprising that it would eventually explode. I'm still calculating
when the break-up had to have occurred, but my suspicion is that Rob
McNaught imaged the aftermath only a few hours after explosion. My
guess is that it broke up near perigee due to the elevated aerodynamic
stresses at that point in the orbit. Perigee occurs on a descending node
in the northern hemisphere around 30 degrees latitude. Rob's observation
was close to 180 degrees away in mean anomaly (i.e. close to apogee on
the ascending node).
Surprisingly, USSPACECOM has not reported this breakup, nor has it
cataloged any new fragments as a result of the breakup. Certainly
McNaught has excellent data from which he and I will be able to
construct dozens of TLEs for the brighter fragments, many of which
are flashing at very high rates.
Do you know the PeA of the cloud of debris ? (meaning, is there any hope they will re-enter before thousand years ?)
Russia’s Briz-M booster, which failed to put two satellites into their target orbit, is likely to keep flying in space for up to five months before sinking into the thicker layers of the atmosphere, a rocket industry source told RIA Novosti on Wednesday.
Additionally the atmospheric drag of small parts would be lower, so it takes longer for them to fall down.
My concern is that the orbit passes all LEO-objects, ISS included, we already have the fun with the debris of other destroyed satellites...
Additionally the atmospheric drag of small parts would be lower
It's official. The following message is on the USSTRATCOM Space-track website:I will try getting better information this week, maybe I can find out if somebody more professional can confirm the fragmentation event.
It's official. The following message is on the USSTRATCOM Space-track website:
JFCC SPACE is currently working to characterize
the 16 October 2012 break up of a rocket body (Catalog # 38746)
and assess the impact of the debris field to objects on orbit. We will
continue to provide notification of potential conjunctions and update
the Satellite Catalog via established processes.