News Japan Earthquake, Tsunami, & Nuclear Disaster

[Wishbone]

IAEA's releases are getting more and more interesting (emphasis mine - W.):

Japanese Earthquake Update (18 March 12:25 UTC)

18 March 2011

Announcements, Featured

Japanese authorities have informed the IAEA that, prior to the earthquake of 11 March, the entire fuel core of reactor unit 4 of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant had been unloaded from the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pond located in the reactor’s building.



CLARIFICATION
Contrary to several news reports, the IAEA to date has NOT received any notification from the Japanese authorities of people sickened by radiation contamination.

In the report of 17 March 01:15 UTC, the cases described were of people who were reported to have had radioactive contamination detected on them when they were monitored.

 

[SiberianTiger]

http://en.ura-inform.com/neformat/2011/03/18/gruz?nocache&nocache

France sends aid to Japan in Ukrainian aircraft

Thus, the largest airline in the world will arrive on March 19 in France with the purpose of loading equipment on board. In Japan, the aircraft will arrive on March 20 and will land in Tokyo - 21 th.

Meanwhile, the French will give the Japanese robotics on caterpillar tracks, allowing to work in harsh conditions rubble. Technology will have remote control system. The total weight of cargo, delivered to Japan, will be 140 t.

 

[Sky Captain]

Not so harmless, only harmful substances of pretty short half-life, for example nitrogen-13, which is formed inside the water by xyogen capturing beta radiation. That is why there are such radiation spikes when steam is vented, that quickly disappear again.

Well, the radioactive stuff dispersed anyway when building exploded. Maybe when they decided to went in building they just hoped there will be no ignition sources to set off H2.

 

[Urwumpe]

IAEA's releases are getting more and more interesting (emphasis mine - W.):

Doesn't fit to the report of TEPCO, that one of their workers got a pretty significant dose of radiation, that was only 0.3 Sv short of causing instant injury.

 

[Sky Captain]

In short, a combo of LOCA and loss-of-off-site power is a showstopper, right? What can the 3rd-plus and 4th generation designs offer to offset this vulnerability?

The AP1000 reactor has passive core cooling system that don't recquire power to run and after activation can function for 3 days with no input from operator. If water supplies is periodically replenished then system can safely cool the reactor as long as recquired.

 

[Wishbone]

Compiling a list of misfits is probably a major waste of time.

http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/110317_0000.html

Telephone Conference Between Prime Minister Kan and US President Obama



Thursday, March 17, 2011
[Provisional Translation]
JAPANESE


On Thursday, March 17, for 30 minutes from 10:22 a.m., Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan held a telephone conference with the Honorable Barack Obama, President of the United States of America. The outline of their discussion is as follows.

1. President Obama expressed his profound sympathy and his deep confidence in the leadership of Prime Minister Kan. He conveyed the message that the United States was prepared to extend a full range of aid, including not just the immediate measures already underway, such as relief activities by US Armed Forces stationed in Japan and rescue team operations, but the dispatch of more nuclear power specialists and participation in medium- to long-range reconstruction efforts.

2. In response, Prime Minister Kan expressed his gratitude for American support. He also explained that Japan was mobilizing all organizations, including the police and Self-Defense Forces, to respond to the nuclear power station accidents. In addition, Prime Minister Kan responded that Japan intended to confer closely with the United States regarding the aid offered by the American side, and that nuclear power experts dispatched by the United States and Japanese specialists would continue to collaborate closely.

Translation from newspeak (provisional):

BHO. Do you want our help?
NK. No, it is a week since the emergency started and we've mobilized the SDF only now. But to avoid the public shame of being helped out by the Yanks, we'll eat dust of our countryside and will glow in the dark afterwards.

===
EDIT: HEADS WILL ROLL

Press Conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary



Thursday, March 17 at 06:42pm, 2011
[Provisional Translation]
JAPANESE


CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY EDANO: I have a few points I want to cover first. At a meeting today of the Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Measures, the headquarters chief took a decision to establish under his authority a Subsidiary Headquarters for Special Measures to Assist the Lives of Disaster Victims. This decision was taken in order to strengthen the system in place for assisting the daily lives of those affected by the disaster.

In connection with this, I have several personnel announcements to make. Effective as of today's date, Yoshi*o Sengoku, acting president of the Democratic Party of Japan, is appointed as deputy chief cabinet secretary. The outgoing Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirohisa Fujii will become a special advisor to the prime minister. Koichi Kato has been relieved of his duties as a special advisor to the prime minister at his own request. The new Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary will be officially invested with the office by the Emperor at the palace at eight this evening. One reason for these appointments is that Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujii, whose official duties since the earthquake have placed him under considerable pressure despite his advanced years, has personally informed the prime minister that he was approaching the limits of his physical strength to continue in his present capacity.

At the same time, the prime minister was conscious of the need to further strengthen the Cabinet Secretariat in order to improve the system in place for assisting the daily lives of those affected by the disaster. For this reason, the prime minister has accepted Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujii's request. However, the prime minister was eager to keep his services, feeling that his experience and insight are particularly vital to the government in this situation, given the extremely important role he has fulfilled in a different position from Kato, especially in recent days in connection with the electricity supply situation and the rotating power cuts. Since the law limits the number of advisors to five, it was decided to appoint Fujii as a special advisor in Kato's place, in order to provide practical assistance to the prime minister and myself, and to work with the support of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku as part of a strengthened Cabinet Secretariat to provide assistance to the lives of disaster victims.

Accordingly, the following appointments have been made to the new headquarters for special measures to assist the lives of disaster victims. Minister of State for Disaster Management Ryu Matsumoto will act as headquarters chief, and Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Yoshihiro Katayama as acting headquarters chief, with a view to reflecting the voices of people in the affected regions. Senior Vice Minister of Cabinet Office Tatsuo Hirano will act as deputy headquarters chief and director general of the new headquarters. Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku will be officially appointed at eight this evening. Together, this new team will do everything in their power to carry forward the work of assisting the lives of disaster victims.

Also in connection with this, a decision was taken at today's meeting of the Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Measures, and subsequently ratified by a round robin cabinet meeting, that whereas until now myself and the Minister of State for Disaster Management have acted as deputy headquarters chiefs for the Headquarters for Emergency Disaster Measures as a whole, from now on the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications and the Minister of Defense will additionally serve as headquarters chiefs.

Following today's decision, the new headquarters will work to resolve the problem of isolated emergency refuge areas, to ensure steady replenishment of supplies, and to restore vital lifelines. It will also work to further enhance measures to provide material support to affected areas. Many people around the country have offered to provide temporary shelters for disaster victims in their homes rather than letting them continue to subsist on the bare minimum in cold emergency refuge areas. Today's decision indicates our resolve to further strengthen our ability to respond to measures like these in the future.

In addition, I have two further requests to make to the people of Japan. The first is concerns about the rotating power cuts currently being implemented in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Under the scheduled power cuts, it is extremely difficult to keep the railway system operational, given the overall demand for electricity. However, because keeping the trains moving to at least a certain extent is vital to people's lives, we have so far been working to maintain a somewhat reduced service at electricity usage levels just below threshold capacity. But I have received reports that a situation has arisen, partly because of today's colder weather, in which we are now facing the possibility that demand could easily outstrip capacity. The relevant minister has already asked the people to make even more strenuous efforts to conserve electricity. We are already asking people to accept considerable hardship as it is, with the rotating power cuts and reduced train services. Nevertheless, the fact is that we are already almost at capacity, and we now face a situation in which we risk comprehensive and unpredictable power failures across the board unless everyone cooperates in the strenuous efforts to conserve electricity. I therefore ask all of you, please, in addition to the rotating power cuts, to make every effort to conserve as much electricity as you possibly can.

Also, over the past few days there have been reports of bank transfer-related identity fraud in which people have attempted to take advantage of the damage and suffering sustained as a result of this disaster. People in the affected areas and emergency refuge areas are doing their best to cope with an extremely challenging and harsh situation. The Self-Defense Forces, fire fighters, police, and many others are also working in extremely harsh and often dangerous conditions to overcome this national disaster. It is extremely regrettable that cases like this should have arisen in which people have tried to take advantage of the situation in this way. However, it is also a fact, and I would ask you therefore to be on your guard.

That is all from me for now.

EDIT #2: At 16:48 JST March 18, TOKAI UNIT 2 seawater pump motor of emergency diesel-generator 2C failed. Source NISA (http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110319-1.pdf)

EDIT #3: The compiler is not responsible for the OF software marking Japanese surnames with asterisks.

 

[Urwumpe]

How strong this Earthquake was: even in Munich, almost on the other side of the planet, a 2 cm amplitude low-frequency oscillation was measured by seismometers.

 

[Wishbone]

A color-coded chart summarizing the conditions at Fukushima Daiichi:

http://www.iaea.org/press/?p=1463

 

[RGClark]

Depends on what catches fire. If it is zircalloy cladding or fragments of Uranium oxide fuel, it becomes very hard, water would only fuel the fire then as oxygen source.
From a point on, you can only dump as much dense matter at it as possible to contain the radioactive materials, because the chemical reactions will go on in the presence of enough water or air.

So if the zirconium cladding does catch on fire then what we would normally use to put out a fire water would only make it worse. The criticism has been made of the Chernobyl design of using graphite control rods which would burn at high temperatures. But use of zirconium cladding that when on fire will feed the fire with the water used to put it out could be just as bad.
Plans need to be put in place beforehand in case the zirconium cladding does catch fire on how to put it out.


Bob Clark

 

[Belisarius]

BBC video report on their rolling log shows a Japan Times graphic on radiation levels around the area, all low.

Couldn't find the graphic on the JT website, but there IS radiation data from NISA (Japanese Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency) in the form of PDF reports from around the risk area:

http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/saigaijohou/syousai/1303723.htm

13:00 Mar 19, 2011 （PDF:392KB）
Monitoring data at Ibaraki prefecture(13:00 Mar 19, 2011) （PDF:403KB）
19:00 Mar 18, 2011 （PDF:132KB）
Monitoring data at Ibaraki prefecture(19:00 Mar 18, 2011) （PDF:125KB）
10:00 Mar 18, 2011 （PDF:350KB）
Monitoring data at Ibaraki prefecture(13:00 Mar 18, 2011) （PDF:363KB）
19:00 Mar 17, 2011 （PDF:363KB）
Monitoring data at Ibaraki prefecture(19:00 Mar 17, 2011) （PDF:347KB）

Looking briefly at them it seems levels are indeed low. Only the plant itself seems to have dangerous levels of emissions.

Ibariki pref. is just south of Fukushima.

Looking at the latest one (still in Japanese only, but it's easy to understand if you look at the earlier ones in English) we can see that the earlier peak of 5.8 microSv/h at 0800 on the 15 March has diminished steadily to 1.1 microSv/h at 1130 on the 19 March

15 March
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/other/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/03/19/1303840_9_1.pd

19 March (Japanese - but same format as the earlier one)
http://www.mext.go.jp/component/a_menu/other/detail/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2011/03/19/1303724_12.pdf

Given that this data is so reassuring, it really is surprising that you have to dig through a load of text pages and work very hard to find it. I would have thought they'd be pleased to make this a public presentation in a news conference.

 

[RGClark]

Can't remember if this was discussed here yet:

Experts Had Long Criticized Potential Weakness in Design of Stricken Reactor.
By TOM ZELLER Jr.
Published: March 15, 2011
"Questions about the design escalated in the mid-1980s, when Harold Denton, an official with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, asserted that Mark 1 reactors had a 90 percent probability of bursting should the fuel rods overheat and melt in an accident.
"Industry officials disputed that assessment, saying the chance of failure was only about 10 percent."
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/asia/16contain.html

My intent here is not to beat up on GE, but to get them to actually DO something.

Just saw this:

With Quest to Cool Fuel Rods Stumbling, U.S. Sees ‘Weeks’ of Struggle.
Published: March 17, 2011

General Electric said it would send about 10 gas turbine generators to Japan to help replace lost power generating capacity. Michael Tetuan, a spokesman for the company, said that the operators of the damaged plant had requested generators, but he did not know what they would be used for. The units can produce roughly the same amount of power as the diesel generators at nuclear plants.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/18/world/asia/18nuclear.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1

That's good. A problem may remain however of the electrically powered pumps being inoperable.
I suggest then that combustion powered pumps also be brought in that can run on combustion alone, bypassing the need of electrical power.
GE has some great engineers. They created the GE90 jet engine, the most powerful turbojet engine in existence. It puts out a max horsepower of 145,000 hp, over 100 megawatts.
It was estimated on this forum that the cooling system pumps at Fukushima might be 1 MW. So a much smaller engine than the GE90 could power such pumps. Then such a combustion driven pump could be produced by directing the exhaust from the engine towards a turbine connected to a propeller to pump water.
This could be analogous to how a windmill powered water pump works. You might want to use high bypass engine such as the GE90 and use only the [ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bypass_ratio"]bypass air[/ame] and not the hot combustion gases to turn the turbine, since such engines get most of their power from the air drawn in by the fan in front that bypasses the combustion chamber anyway.
Or you could use a gas turbine already connected to a driveshaft to produce rotary motion as with high power helicopter engines to drive the propellers of a pump.
Another possibility might be to use a locomotive engine to provide the power to drive the pump propellers. GE makes the [ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GE_AC6000CW"]7HDL engine[/ame] for locomotives rated at over 6,000 HP, 4.5 megawatts.



Bob Clark

 

[Urwumpe]

How the tsunami looked like further out on the ocean (in relatively shallow waters)

 

[Wishbone]

WARNING: MEXT numbers are the excess radioactivity above background levels (source - MIT NSE blog AFAIR).

EDIT: Question. The BBC news web site shows a graphic with a caption "80 km exclusion zone recommended by the United States". Where and when was it recommended?

 

[tblaxland]

EDIT: Question. The BBC news web site shows a graphic with a caption "80 km exclusion zone recommended by the United States". Where and when was it recommended?

Not sure exactly, but approx 2 days ago because I read it in yesterday morning's paper. ARPANSA has recommended the same: http://www.arpansa.gov.au/News/MediaReleases/mr1_190311_2100.cfm

 

[Thunder Chicken]

I just recently found this on Youtube - a PSA geared toward children in Japan.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5sakN2hSVxA&feature=player_embedded#at=0

 

[Wishbone]

Got it: March 16 NRC release: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2011/11-050.pdf

EDIT: From the ARPANSA link cited above, got the following nugget:

However, the weather forecasts predict a wind change on the morning of Sunday March 20. From Sunday morning, the behaviour of the winds is quite complex, with many wind shifts over the subsequent days. Any airborne radioactivity released during this period is predicted to pass across mainland Japan.

---------- Post added at 03:05 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:37 PM ----------

NRC notice to US NPPs:

ML110760432
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

March 18, 2011
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2011-05: TOHOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI EARTHQUAKE
EFFECTS ON JAPANESE NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of effects of the Tohoku-Taiheiyou-Oki Earthquake on nuclear power plants in Japan. The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The following summary of events is provided based on the best information available at this time. The situation in Japan regarding recovery efforts for the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station continues to evolve on an hourly basis.

On March 11, 2011, the TohokuнTaiheiyouнOki Earthquake occurred near the east coast of Honshu, Japan. This magnitude 9.0 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami caused significant damage to at least four of the six units of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station as the result of a sustained loss of both the offsite and onнsite power systems. Efforts to restore power to emergency equipment have been hampered or impeded by damage to the surrounding areas due to the tsunami and earthquake.

Units 1 through 3, which had been operating at the time of the earthquake, scrammed automatically, inserting their neutron absorbing control rods to ensure immediate shutdown of the fission process. Following the loss of electric power to normal and emergency core cooling systems and the subsequent failure of backнup decay heat removal systems, water injection into the cores of all three reactors was compromised, and reactor water levels could not be maintained. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the operator of the plant, resorted to injecting sea water and boric acid into the reactor vessels of these three units, in an effort to cool the fuel and ensure the reactors remained shutdown. However, the fuel in the reactor cores became partially uncovered. Hydrogen gas built up in Units 1 and 3 as a result of exposed, overheated fuel reacting with water. Following gas venting from the primary containment to relieve pressure, hydrogen explosions occurred in both units and damaged the secondary containments. It appears that primary containments for Units 1 and 3 remain functional, but the primary containment for Unit 2 may be damaged. TEPCO cut a hole in the side of the Unit 2 secondary containment to prevent hydrogen buildup following a sustained period when there was no water injection into the core.
In addition, Units 3 and 4 have low spent fuel pool (SFP) water levels. Efforts continue to supply seawater to the SFPs for Units 1 through 4 using various methods. At this time, the integrity of the SFPs for Units 3 and 4 is unknown.
Fukushima Daiichi Units 4 through 6 were shutdown for refueling outages at the time of the earthquake. The fuel assemblies for Unit 4 had been offloaded from the reactor core to the SFP.

The SFPs for Units 5 and 6 appear to be intact, but the temperature of the pool water appears to be increasing. Emergency power is available to provide cooling water flow through the SFPs for Units 5 and 6.

The Japanese Government ordered an evacuation out to 20 km for the area surrounding Fukushima Daiichi. Residents out to 30 km were ordered to shelter in place.

The damage to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station appears to have been caused by initiating events outside of the design basis for the facilities.

BACKGROUND

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, ``Design Bases for Protection against Natural Phenomena,'' or similar appropriate requirements in the licensing basis for a reactor facility, requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design bases for these SSCs reflect: (1) appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena, and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed.

As a result of the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC issued EA-02-026, ``Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures'' (the ICM Order) dated February 25, 2002. The ICM Order, which is designated as Safeguards Information (SGI), modified then-operating licenses for commercial power reactor facilities to require compliance with specified interim safeguards and security compensatory measures. Section B.5.b of the ICM Order requires licensees to adopt mitigation strategies using readily available resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities to cope with the loss of large areas of the facility due to large fires and explosions from any cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft impacts.

By letter, dated February 25, 2005, the NRC staff provided guidance for implementing Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. This guidance, designated as SGI, included best practices for mitigating losses of large areas of the plant and measures to mitigate fuel damage and minimize releases. Following issuance of the B.5.b Phase 1 Guidance, the NRC staff conducted inspections at operating reactor sites using Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/164 (SGI) and subsequently TI 2515/168 (SGI) to ensure compliance with Section B.5.b of the ICM Order.

In December 2006, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) issued NEI 06-12, Revision 2, ``B.5.b Phase 2 & 3 Submittal Guideline.'' NEI 06-12 is designated for Official Use Only -- Security Related Information (OUO-SRI). The NRC endorsed NEI 06-12, Revision 2, by letter dated December 22, 2006, also designated OUO-SRI, as an acceptable means for developing and implementing the mitigation strategies requirement in Section B.5.b of the ICM Order. NEI 06-12, Revision 2, provides guidance for implementing a set of strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of a large area of the plant due to explosions or fire. NEI 06-12 provides guidance in the following areas:

. Adding make-up water to the SFP,
. Spraying water on the spent fuel,
. Enhanced initial command and control activities for challenges to core cooling and containment, and
. Enhanced response strategies for challenges to core cooling and containment.

The specific strategies covered in NEI 06н12, Revision 2, were developed based on the results of assessments conducted at currently licensed power reactor facilities for the purpose of enhancing plant specific mitigation capability for damage conditions caused by a large explosion or fire. These assessments identified a wide spectrum of potential plant specific strategies.
NEI 06н12, Revision 2, specifies one set of strategies applicable to all pressurized-water reactors and another set applicable to all boilingнwater reactors. Both sets are derived from the results of the plant specific assessments.

The B.5.b Phase 1 Guidance and NEI 06н12, Revision 2, were used by each licensee in preparing information submitted to the NRC that describes a plant specific approach to implementing mitigating strategies and supports each plant specific license condition. The NRC staff has completed its review of the information submitted by each licensee, as well as information obtained during prior NRC inspections, and has issued an OUOнSRI safety evaluation (SE) that documents the bases for its approval of the license condition for each facility. The SE issued for each licensee includes regulatory guidance in Section 3.0 of Appendix A, ``Phase 1 Assessment,'' that recites the generic B.5.b Phase 1 Guidance of Reference 3, as clarified in TI 2515/168, in a form that is designated OUOнSRI rather than SGI.

By publishing new requirements in the Federal Register dated March 27, 2009 (74 FR 13926), the NRC amended 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR Part 52, `Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,'' and 10 CFR Part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.''

This rulemaking added paragraph (i) to 10 CFR 50.34, ``Contents of Applications; Technical Information,'' and paragraph (d) to 10 CFR 52.80 `` Contents of Applications; Additional Technical Information,'' to require submittal of a ``description and plans for implementation of the
guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire as required by з 50.54(hh)(2) of this chapter.'' This rulemaking also added 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) to impose the same mitigating strategies requirements on all reactor applicants and licensees as those imposed by the ICM Order and associated license conditions. The Statement of Considerations for this rulemaking specifically noted that the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh) are intended to address certain events that are the cause of large fires and explosions that affect a substantial portion of the nuclear power plant and are not limited or directly linked to an aircraft impact. In addition, the rule contemplates that the initiating event for such large fires and explosions could be any number of beyondнdesign basis events. Such events include natural phenomena such as those described in GDC 2 (i.e., earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, tsunami, and seiches), without regard to the GDC 2 provisions governing the severity of natural phenomena.

NRC regulations at 10 CFR 50.63, ``Loss of All Alternating Current Power,'' require that light-water-cooled nuclear power plants be capable of withstanding for a specified duration and recovering from a station blackout.

DISCUSSION

The nuclear power industry has taken the actions listed below at each licensed reactor site.
Additional information is available in the NEI Fact Sheet (http://resources.nei.org/documents/...ion_to_Ensure_Continued_Safety_Fact_Sheet.pdf), ``Industry Taking Action to Ensure Continued Safety at U.S. Nuclear Energy Plants,'' dated March 16, 2011, available at www.nei.org.

1. verification of the capability to mitigate conditions that result from severe adverse events, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems due to natural events, fires, aircraft impact and explosions
2. verification of the capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to a nuclear power plant
3. verification of the capability to mitigate flooding and the impact of floods on systems inside and outside the plant
4. identification of the potential for loss of equipment functions during seismic events appropriate for the site and the development of mitigating strategies to address potential vulnerabilities

NRC assessment of the implications of beyond design-basis natural phenomena is continuing as more information becomes available. The NRC staff is currently developing a TI to guide staff in performing independent assessments of nuclear power plant readiness to address beyond design-basis natural phenomena under the Reactor Oversight Process. The NRC is considering additional generic communications and additional action including requesting operating plants to provide specific information relating to their facilities to enable the NRC staff to complete a regulatory assessment of beyond design basis phenomena.

---------- Post added at 03:35 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:05 PM ----------

BREAKING NEWS:
Traces of radioactive iodine found in tap water in Tokyo
Source: http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/79661.html

EDIT: WARNING - IMBECILE IMMATURE CONTENT: Russian president Dmitry Medvedev called the Japanese to work in Siberia and the Russian Far East...
:facepalm: :facepalm: :facepalm:
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/03/18/jobs/

 

[Cairan]

Talk about conflicting information:

In Maebashi, Gunma, 2.5 becquerels of iodine and 0.38 becquerel of cesium were detected Friday per kilogram of water, the prefectural government said, adding it is the first time the substances were found since it began testing tap water for radioactive materials in 1990.

The Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan limits an intake of iodine at 300 becquerels per kilogram of water and of cesium at 200 becquerels.

But at this other dispatch from Kyodo: http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/79673.html

The ministry said 77 becquerels of iodine was found per kilogram of water in Tochigi, 2.5 becquerels in Gunma, 0.62 becquerels in Saitama, 0.79 becquerels in Chiba, 1.5 becquerels in Tokyo and 0.27 becquerels in Niigata.

And some other information from http://www.facebook.com/iaeaorg :

Japanese authorities have implemented two critical measures to counter the contamination of food products by radioactive iodine. First, on 16 March, Japan's Nuclear Safety Commission recommended local authorities to instruct evacuees leaving the 20-kilometre area to ingest stable (not radioactive) iodine. As an established method of prevention, the ingestion of stable iodine can help to prevent the accumulation of radioactive iodine in the thyroid. Stable iodine pills and syrup (for children) have been made available at evacuation centres. Second, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has requested an investigation into the possible stop of sales of food products from the Fukushima Prefecture.

 

[Sky Captain]

According to wikipedia article
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Tōhoku_earthquake_and_tsunami#Energy the Japanese earthquake released total of 9.3 teratons of energy. Not really suprising considering it caused the Pacific plate to shift by 20 meters.

 

[Linguofreak]

But at this other dispatch from Kyodo: http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/79673.html

77 in Tochigi, 2.5 in Gunma. The first source gave 2.5 in Gunma, but didn't mention Tochigi.

---------- Post added at 16:56 ---------- Previous post was at 16:47 ----------

I just recently found this on Youtube - a PSA geared toward children in Japan.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5sakN2hSVxA&feature=player_embedded#at=0

Brain bleach please!

 

[Urwumpe]

Brain bleach please!

Ok, old classic brain bleach: