Teleportation (forked from Sci-Fi Anti-G suit design)

[dgatsoulis]

Just my "two cents" in this thread... (Which i've been following with quite some interest!)

A "copy" is... only a copy, if it knows that it's a copy. If there is an "original" in our universe... then one day... the copy WILL know, that it is a copy.

If there's no way of knowing that... (like deleting the "original") then, you have every right to think that you are the "original".

As for the "different object" arguement:
How can one tell a Helium atom, from another Helium atom? After all, they are made of the SAME sub-atomic particles.

 

[Face]

Then again, there are major theories (holographic principle for example), that suggest information, matter and energy are equivalent.
If so, the true object would be the information, and material things would be cases of it.

When I first read about Einstein's famous equation, this was the first I thought of: matter == energy == data . Of course it is a very simplified view, but I have not come across a - tested - scientific theory that contradicts this thought.

Thus I agree with Artlav in this discussion: with desintegrator/assembler techniques, the meaning of "original" and "copy" will vanish quickly, as they are just labels we give to real-world entities, and the exchange of data can be seen as movement of matter (or vice versa).

One thing is for sure, however: this is a very interesting philosophical discussion, and the aspects of the problem are far from having an obvious solution. Therefore, I will certainly stay away from using the face-palm smiley here .

regards,
Face

 

[T.Neo]

That's right.
I guess whether it matters or not is a question of situation, preferences or beliefs.
And in real world also a question of the technology's limitations.

Then again, there are major theories (holographic principle for example), that suggest information, matter and energy are equivalent.
If so, the true object would be the information, and material things would be cases of it.

Did I say anything against case of information?

I never said, that two identical copies would not be two copies. I just said that they would be different copies.

I'm not talking about data, I'm not talking about patterns, I'm talking about objects. Object, case of information, astro-file, whatever. It doesn't matter that they're identical. They are two seperate objects and thus two seperate entities.

Unknown, exactly. And so the emotion is not coming from an object, but is something you have.

Emotion based on an attribute that the object has.


Dgatsoulis' argument is pretty interesting;

How can one tell a Helium atom, from another Helium atom? After all, they are made of the SAME sub-atomic particles.

Say I gave you a helium atom perfectly contained in some sort of... atomic flask.

Then I took that flask away, siphoned off the atom, and then placed in a new atom from my convieniently placed tank of helium atoms.

Have I given you the same atom?

Thus I agree with Artlav in this discussion: with desintegrator/assembler techniques, the meaning of "original" and "copy" will vanish quickly, as they are just labels we give to real-world entities, and the exchange of data can be seen as movement of matter (or vice versa).

But the copy is not the original; that is part of the data. It isn't data that the copy carries with itself- like it would carry data on its mass, its kinetic energy, what particles it is made of- but the data of the destruction of the original and the creation of the copy is a distinct event that has distinct informational attributes to it.

If you can think of time as a sort of fourth dimension, this event is clearly present in time even if it isn't obvious from the event's past or future.

 

[Artlav]

Have I given you the same atom?

No, you given him a different atom, and that can be traced if you can follow back all the interactions that happened.

But the main question is - does it make a difference?
It is called a different atom, but it's identical to the other one. And whatever use it's put for, it would behave the same way.

So, it's not about it being different object, but when and if the difference matter.


If a machine creates a copy and keeps the original, the difference matter.
If the original is destroyed and the copy is perfect, then the difference does not matter.
No?

 

[dgatsoulis]

If the "copy" is "perfect"...and the "original" is destroyed (out of our universe), then it doesn't matter!

 

[Spacethingy]

How about quantum teleportation?

Scientists can give one atom another atom's quantum state.

One atom becomes another atom. Scale it up using the handwavium bank of this discussion. When you teleport using this tech, the material at the destination becomes your atoms. Not a copy of your atoms, but actually your atoms.

Using the computer file analogy, this is different. Copying files, the original is deleted, destroyed. The copy is very different in things like "date modified" properties etc. But if a copy is exact...

Aw no, I've gone back several pages! Sorry, that was going somewhere...

 

[dgatsoulis]

This is why i love Orbiter. Noobs, such as me and a few others... can make (somewhat) coherent claims, about the universe!

 

[T.Neo]

But the main question is - does it make a difference?
It is called a different atom, but it's identical to the other one. And whatever use it's put for, it would behave the same way.

For the purpose of this discussion, which is whether the atom is different or not, the fact that it is identical atom does not matter, what matters is the history of that atom.

So, it's not about it being different object, but when and if the difference matter.


If a machine creates a copy and keeps the original, the difference matter.
If the original is destroyed and the copy is perfect, then the difference does not matter.
No?

No, that is extremely silly. All you have done is just destroyed the original object; you cannot prevent it from being a factual construct.

 

[Quick_Nick]

I don't believe that arguing about definitions is going to get anywhere. We all know that you have a different object with the same data. The question is really whether you would be okay with it, which is an opinion and no scientific fact. Maybe you'll miss grandma's antique and feel disturbed by manufacturing by machines, or maybe you don't care that your new antique didn't arrive the old-fashioned way.

 

[fsci123]

I have a STRONG feeling that one would need to freeze the motion of EVERYTHING before you can began to copy or reassemble... The only way to do that is freezing everything to absolute zero which by the laws of thermodynamics cannot be reached using only thermodynamic means...

You would also die in the process and will either go to hell or heaven... And it wouldnt be a painless death you wouldn't have the pleasure sense and the endorphines or the tunnel it would be just death...

You would not be reborn into your re-assemblage(assuming both disintegration and re-creation is successful) as you would now be dead with some person walking around with your memories...

 

[Quick_Nick]

"That person" would feel as though he teleported, and he is indeed a real person. (i'd like to keep religion and souls out of it)
Either way, you're right that assembling the entirety of one's atomic data would require freezing. So maybe we need a larger scale approximation.

 

[Hielor]

But what if they're so identical they can't be told apart by any process, and you forgot which one was the original? Do you decide which one to hold an emotional attachment to at random?

The original is the one that was smashed into pieces.

 

[Sisco]

I'm immediately reminded by this comic.

Anyway, I think it's clear that a teleporter in the traditional sense kills the original person, and makes an identical copy on the other side. Sure, nobody can tell the difference, and the new person believes themselves to be the original, but the original person is still dead.

I would not use a teleporter.

 

[Artlav]

All you have done is just destroyed the original object; you cannot prevent it from being a factual construct.

It's a fact, yet what matters is practicality. Does that difference matter? It's as good as the original object.
For cases of prized objects it seems to matter, if you know it was done.
I guess we got to the point of preferences.

the original person is still dead.

And back to the same question: At which point do you stop being the original and become a copy?
At which point do you die?
Unless we invoke something outside the universe, there is no you to die or keep living.

 

[T.Neo]

It's a fact, yet what matters is practicality. Does that difference matter? It's as good as the original object.
For cases of prized objects it seems to matter, if you know it was done.
I guess we got to the point of preferences.

Who says it's as good as the original object?

There is an undeniable fact that the original is destroyed and the copy is not the same object. It is an identical object, but it is not the same object.

So it goes back to basically my original statement: if you want to destroy yourself and create an identical copy of yourself, go for it. You can believe they're the same entity as much as you want, the copy can believe that it's the same entity as much as it wants, but the fact remains that they're seperate entities.

The only way they can be the same entity, is if we postulate something outside the universe (i.e. a 'soul') that dissasociates from the original and then re-associates with the copy. But that is a whole other discussion that delves to realms far beyond what we're talking about here.

 

[Artlav]

The only way they can be the same entity, is if we postulate something outside the universe (i.e. a 'soul') that dissasociates from the original and then re-associates with the copy.

In my understanding it's completely opposite - if there is an external soul, then the copy being another object would matter, because the soul is gone from the destroyed one, and the copy won't have the same soul.

But if there is no soul, then the copy would be the same as the destroyed original.

Same about the teapot - the difference matter because you think it matters - it's a prized object.
If it's a practical object, then a copy is as useful as the original.

Your attachment to it is it's soul - a thing outside of it. A copy won't have the same soul.
But if it was a wheel on a car, you won't lament about it's bursting, but just copy the other one and keep driving.


It's curious how we draw the opposite conclusions from the same argument, i wonder what is the difference?

 

[T.Neo]

You're viewing the teleportee as a wheel on a car, I'm viewing it as a teapot...

 

[Artlav]

Then what is prizing him?

 

[T.Neo]

Him.

Humans aren't commodities. You can assemble wheels and french fries and new telephones whichever way you like, that has no parallel to destroying someone and creating a copy of them.

It doesn't matter that the copy coming out of the machine is identical, it matters that it's a copy. It is not the original object.

In this case, it is not the original person.

 

[Artlav]

In this case, it is not the original person.

Once again, why do you thing it matters?
If there is no soul to loose, then what other difference is there?