Space Shuttle Close Call

How are they close calls?

In both cases the highly trained MCC staff and astronaunts did their jobs.
 
How are they close calls?

In both cases the highly trained MCC staff and astronaunts did their jobs.
In STS-68, the MCC had no role. It was the KSC Firing Room staff in the LCC. MCC only takes over once the vehicle has cleared the tower. Until then, KSC controls ops. MCC is just in listen-in mode.
 
How are they close calls?

In both cases the highly trained MCC staff and astronaunts did their jobs.

They were close calls because they were ALMOST a failure if the astronauts didn't act quickly and attentively.
 
They were close calls because they were ALMOST a failure if the astronauts didn't act quickly and attentively.

Wrong.

No astronaut has even a chance of reacting in such situations. It is the RSLS software and the Engine Controller which react. They do what they are designed to do. Especially the Engine Controller has a really demanding task, as the time from anomaly to explosion is just milliseconds for turbomachinery with such power densities.

STS-9 was a real close call again without people being aware of what really happened, but you will sure not find any Youtube videos with brainless descriptions and even more brainless comments about that one.

In the pad abort, the crew just has the task to power down the shuttle on NTD call, or leave it quickly if things go really wrong.
 
STS-68 was a close-call as you can hear the CGLS operator report:
CGLS said:
We have a cut-off. GLS safing is in progress, PASS is 101, BFS moded to 102, LDB shows 1
.

This means according to BFS, the vehicle did launch. They came only a split-second away from the SRB holddown bolts being blown which would have made this end in tragedy.
 
Well... the abort on the pad was controled by the onboard computers. And the Engine Out happened just after the ATO call. In either case there was little need for action by humans. Does the CDR even use the abort rotary switch for an ATO? I need to look at my abort manuals.



EDIT: Woops, took way too long to post.:dry:
 
Sorry, forgot that the computer conducted the SSME shutdown in the pad abort!

It is also responsible for the ATO. First in shutting down the engine which exceeded the red lines (in that case, because of a wrong sensor reading), second as a special software on the ground calculates all the time during launch, which abort options are available and which is the most promising.

The humans are deciding in the loop, but unless there is something obviously wrong with the output of the computers, people will not notice it and rely on it.
 
In STS-68, the MCC had no role. It was the KSC Firing Room staff in the LCC. MCC only takes over once the vehicle has cleared the tower. Until then, KSC controls ops. MCC is just in listen-in mode.

fair point but my original argument that they are not close calls and that the crew, firing room/MCC all worked together as there were trained to do is still valid!
 
This means according to BFS, the vehicle did launch. They came only a split-second away from the SRB holddown bolts being blown which would have made this end in tragedy.

I think this BFS reaction is also part of the anomaly report for STS-68, but it does not appear as Inflight Anomaly. The abort happened at T-1.9 seconds. 1.8 seconds before the bolts are destroyed.

Important is the PASS reaction, the BFS does not have the RSLS software and does not have any role pre-launch.
 
It is also responsible for the ATO. First in shutting down the engine which exceeded the red lines (in that case, because of a wrong sensor reading), second as a special software on the ground calculates all the time during launch, which abort options are available and which is the most promising.

The humans are deciding in the loop, but unless there is something obviously wrong with the output of the computers, people will not notice it and rely on it.

In the case of the ATO, let's not forget that a ground controller found that the first engine shutdown must have been due to a spurious reading when he saw the same scenario developp in the other engine, and he called to override the engine auto-shutdown sequence before it occured in a second engine. I think at this moment, a two-engine out would have been a Bad Day...
 
Anytime you have an abort on the pad like that, it's a close call. Read Mike Mullane's book about his on-pad abort STS-41D. There was a fire on the pad after the SSMEs shut down, and lots of confusion. Under these circumstances, with all that rocket fuel in the area, including solid fuel, an on-pad abort is always a close call. Should something go really wrong, none of those trained people in the firing room or in Houston can help you, and getting out of the ship and away from the pad takes several minutes, while disaster can happen in a second or less. You have to understand that STS is inherently risky. Unlike Soyuz or Apollo, which had LES rockets to blast the crew to safety (and which did so on one Soyuz launch attempt), STS all they can do is hope nothing really bad goes wrong.
 
You don't want to get too jumpy on that abort switch, though. I remember another saying in Mike Mullane's book - "Better to die than look stupid" ;)
 
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