Space Shuttle Columbia - What could they have done?

[computerex]

I was reading on Wikipedia about the Columbia Disaster, and I came across this:

While Columbia was still in orbit, some engineers suspected damage, but NASA managers limited the investigation, on the grounds that little could be done even if problems were found.

Could the astronauts on board the orbiter done anything to prevent what happened? Could they have taken a shallower reentry profile, skimming the atmosphere to slow down ?

 

[Alexw95]

i heard that if there is nothing you can do about a disaster nasa doesnt tell you that it is going to happen so the chances are they did not evan know until it was to late but im not 100% sure

 

[george7378]

I was also really suprised to find that out - the same happened on Challenger (the engineers suspected damage because of the cold, but managers wouldn't let them delay the launch). I'm sure there would have been a possible re-entry profile to bring them back safely (maybe bring their PeA down to about 85KM and let the drag of a couple of orbits slow them down, and then fly with an AoA that gave them enough lift to fly in the upper atmosphere (the Shuttle has to bank to avoid being shot back into space anyway, so it shouldn't have been a major problem just raising the nose to around 40 degrees AoA and letting it bounce back a couple of times). I think.

 

[PhantomCruiser]

I wouldn't even want to speculate, it's easy to see the problems in hindsight.
I suppose it would really depend on how much damage was done to her leading edge...
And, how much longer could she stay on station? I don't think she had enough fuel to get to the ISS, to hang out for a repair kit to show up.
All in all it was a black day for manned spaceflight.

 

[N_Molson]

The only option available was to apply the contingency plan. Which would probably have disrupted the program the same way. And they only suspected that there could have been a problem.

 

[Orbinaut Pete]

I watched a TV program on this subject a few years ago.

The crew wouldn't have been able to jettison the payload (the SPACEHAB Double Module) to reduce the Shuttle's mass, as the Payload Retention Latch Assemblies (PRLAs) were passive, not active (meaning that the latches could not be released in-flight).

Another option I heard about would have been to conduct the de-orbit burn, and then jump out of the Shuttle when it reached the edge of the atmosphere (obviously with a pressure suit on). But wouldn't the crew have burned-up during re-entry anyway, in-spite of their low mass?

 

[Urwumpe]

Could the astronauts on board the orbiter done anything to prevent what happened? Could they have taken a shallower reentry profile, skimming the atmosphere to slow down ?

Like always: Nothing once they have reached orbit. They could have done a RTLS or a long-distance TAL abort to prevent damage, but they reacted not fast enough.

You can't make the reentry profile as shallow as needed for that. The shuttle needs lift already for reducing the existing reentry angle down to something that the heat shield can deal with - and the profile is selected so the Shuttle keeps the heating minimal, at anytime. A shallow reentry, as many people here describe, would result in MORE heating once the shuttle looses lift and descends at a steeper angle.

 

[jedidia]

Another option I heard about would have been to conduct the de-orbit burn, and then jump out of the Shuttle when it reached the edge of the atmosphere (obviously with a pressure suit on). But wouldn't the crew have burned-up during re-entry anyway, in-spite of their low mass?

It doesn't really sound like a very good Idea, no. On the other hand... They could have torn off some plates of the heat shield an hold on to them during reentry, hiding behind them :lol:
Now I'm amazed that no director ever had the Idea to put THAT in a movie!

Captain to co-pilot after miraculessly succesfull reentry: "say, did you bring a parachute...?"

 

[garyw]

There were also suggestions about sending up Atlantis for a rescue or packing the hole with ice, the idea being that by the time the ice and melted through they would be through the worst heating of entry. it would then be a matter of flying down to about 50,000 feet out over the ocean and bailing out.

Two books I'd recommened:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Comm-Check-...=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1279570264&sr=1-5

and

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Columbia-Fi...=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1279570390&sr=8-1

 

[Orbinaut Pete]

They actually imaged Columbia from the ground to see if any damage was visible. Obviously, the resolution wasn't high enough.

Hi-res version.

Hi-res version.

 

[garyw]

The only option available was to apply the contingency plan. Which would probably have disrupted the program the same way. And they only suspected that there could have been a problem.

True, they never went for a look which was the worst mistake and it was compounded by the fact that Columbia's STS-107 mission wasn't carrying an RMS.

---------- Post added at 21:15 ---------- Previous post was at 21:14 ----------

Pete,

I don't think that's correct, I believe that was just a test rather than a formal request for imaging. The lab came forward with those images several weeks after the accident.

 

[DaveS]

True, they never went for a look which was the worst mistake and it was compounded by the fact that Columbia's STS-107 mission wasn't carrying an RMS.

---------- Post added at 21:15 ---------- Previous post was at 21:14 ----------

Pete,

I don't think that's correct, I believe that was just a test rather than a formal request for imaging. The lab came forward with those images several weeks after the accident.

Correct. Those images were just a test of the AMOS equipment. Hence the standard on-orbit attitude(tail-forward, bay to earth) of the orbiter in the photos.

Potential "what-if" scenarios are included in the CAIB Final Report Volume 1.

Pete: On behalf of the CAIB, LeRory Cain did head up a team that looked into one of those "what-if" scenarios and included jetting alot of non-essential LRUs and all payload bay items, including the aft radiator panels, all to lessen the heat-load on the wings during entry.

Presentation can be found here: http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/9057main_EntryOptionsFinal.pdf

 

[Notebook]

NASA report on Crew Survival:

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf 32MB

 

[ddom2006]

A rescue mission was possible, albeit barely. The crew would have had to EVA to another shuttle, or as said above - It was discussed that the hole be plugged with water packs which would have frozen to ice and might might might have just held during re-entry enough to keep the aerodynamic profile regular enough to complete re-entry.

Of course, sadly none of this was considered till post Columbia, and NASA was... slack to say the least about safety around Columbia. It was a dark day in spaceflight's history.

 

[Keatah]

I was also really suprised to find that out - the same happened on Challenger (the engineers suspected damage because of the cold, but managers wouldn't let them delay the launch). I'm sure there would have been a possible re-entry profile to bring them back safely (maybe bring their PeA down to about 85KM and let the drag of a couple of orbits slow them down, and then fly with an AoA that gave them enough lift to fly in the upper atmosphere (the Shuttle has to bank to avoid being shot back into space anyway, so it shouldn't have been a major problem just raising the nose to around 40 degrees AoA and letting it bounce back a couple of times). I think.

Same thing did *NOT* happen on challenger. Challenger got to an unrecoverable state after the information to prevent it was available. Meaning it was preventable.

Columbia got to the unrecoverable state *BEFORE* information was known. Nothing could be done.

 

[garyw]

And, how much longer could she stay on station? I don't think she had enough fuel to get to the ISS, to hang out for a repair kit to show up.
All in all it was a black day for manned spaceflight.

Columbia wasn't at the ISS. It was in a 39 degree inclination orbit. Changing planes to the ISS was never an option. Again it's another one of lifes cruel irony's that if this had happend to an ISS bound flight even prior to TPS inspection it would have been picked up during the docked stay.

Same thing did *NOT* happen on challenger. Challenger got to an unrecoverable state after the information to prevent it was available. Meaning it was preventable.

Columbia got to the unrecoverable state *BEFORE* information was known. Nothing could be done.

As always the truth is a bit more complex.

Challenger got into difficulites because of a series of circumstances which were known about and were shouted about by engineers and managers at what is today ATK. The problem was that even when they had the chance to postpone STS-51L the ATK management recommend a launch. They didn't want to look bad in the face of their biggest customer and seven people died.
You can't blame ATK for that completely though. You have to look at the NASA politics of the time, the upcoming contracts for shuttle and remember that the accident was survivable if the crew had been wearing ACES suits.

Columbia is almost a repeat of Challenger. The problem had been known of since STS-1. John Young even commented something similar to the words "look at that" as pieces of tank foam flaked off the tank and struck the forward windows. No one imagined that a piece of foam could do so much damage and in a way they were right, no one expect a piece of foam to tumble and be run over by the shuttle.... but these things do happen.
Just like with Challenger, mission managers probably would have taken things seriously if one of the engineers had stood up and said "This is a problem, we might loss the crew" but none did. There was a lot of "what-if's" but they only dealt with serious problems on the right wheel well. I think it was only MAMCS officer Jeff Kling who had any inclination that the problem was more serious and even he didn't shout it at management because he wasn't sure and fully expected Columbia to land.

Interestingly enough, after the Columbia board returned their report Wayne Hale was put in charge of the shuttle programme and the first thing he did was get everyone together and give them a speech which, paraphrased, was something like this "Everyone has told me that both accidents were preventable and that they shouldn't have happend so I'm giving you a chance to prevent the next one. Come tell me where the next problem will be, what the cause of the next accident will be and we'll work together and fix".

Not a single engineer went forward. We sit here in 2010 with 7 years between us and Columbia and 24 years between us and Challenger and with 20-20 hindsight we can point out all the problems and where things went wrong but if anyone of us were in the same situation with the information we had in front of us we would have made the same or similar calls.

 

[Bloodworth]

Still; one would think that with a spacecraft such as the space shuttle, the first order of business upon reaching orbit and the last before deorbit burn would be to sound the ship to make sure that there are no such problems. If a piece of foam could have done that damage, so could a micrometeorite and no one would have been the wiser.

I agree that it is too easy to sit back and critisize with 20/20 hindsight, but at the very least, the ship should have been sounded. Even if an mmu was not present, the shuttle has an RMS BUILT IN! That rms is more than capable of swinging an astronaut over the side and getting him/her to an angle where they can see the entire underside of the ship.

Even if there were nothing that could have been done to solve the problem, at least the crew would have known that the problem existed.

 

[garyw]

I agree that it is too easy to sit back and critisize with 20/20 hindsight, but at the very least, the ship should have been sounded. Even if an mmu was not present, the shuttle has an RMS BUILT IN! That rms is more than capable of swinging an astronaut over the side and getting him/her to an angle where they can see the entire underside of the ship.

Please go back and read my earlier post. NO shuttle has RMS "built in". Columbia had her RMS REMOVED as a weight saving measure for STS-107. There never was an option to use RMS or to put an astronaunt on the end of an RMS arm to have a look.

MMU wasn't an option. it cancelled after STS-51L. Even if it hadn't been cancelled it wouldn't have been on 107 because it weighs more than the RMS.

 

[Alexw95]

couldnt they have dont an eva without the rms?

 

[jedidia]

Still; one would think that with a spacecraft such as the space shuttle, the first order of business upon reaching orbit and the last before deorbit burn would be to sound the ship to make sure that there are no such problems.

And how would you propose to do such a thing? the shuttle isn't exactly a small bird, the time of the astronauts is limited, and even fatal damage can be so small that you have to look very good to see it. You can't expect the astronauts to spend a days EVA activity by looking at every square centimeter of the ships surface.

In this case, someone could have gone out and take a look,since it was known where the damage would be. But make no mistake: Without an RMS, such an excursion would have been a risk in itself (and would contradict standing safety regulations). The Astronaut has to round the docking bay and go out to the wing (no handholds there). I guess the chance of getting lost in space would be negligible if they had a rope, but I don't know if a piece of rope is standard payload for a shuttle. to make things worse, the astronaut might as well have damaged something with it. If there was no rope, the whole action is too dangerous to even think about without an RMS. That would be like freeclimbing on a plaster wall...