Would you say that's any more true than it is for NASA and Roskosmos? After all, the penalties for failure are huge for all of them. And for NASA it seems the (political/PR) benefits of success are pretty small.
Yes, I think there is a qualitatively larger "caution barrier." I'm tied up with work-work at the moment, but will try to share my thoughts on this in more depth a little later.
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So ... returning to this topic with a little more time ... All of the national space programs are fairly conservative but, based on my long dealings with Chinese institutions, I would say that the Chinese program will be conservative in a different way, which may well be the main cause of the relatively slow pace of their flight program.
Especially in state-controlled institutions, as China's space program is, responsibility and decision-making tends to be much more of a "collective" enterprise than in analogous Western settings. There's a thin layer of communist ideology and practice that lends itself to this phenomenon but, much more importantly, there are deep reserves of Confucian social values that tend to push Chinese institutions in this direction. Decision-making tends to happen in very subtle stages of deniable "trial balloons" floated by proxies and through indirect suggestion, which are subject to social "testing" in various formal and informal group settings. Before any formal proposal is made, its acceptance is almost always a foregone conclusion as a result of this process. This process can be maddening and confusing to Westerners who are used to much more transparency in policy-making. It's slow and, on the surface, seems to move in "jumps," because only the most superficial and least important part of the process is visible to "outsiders" -- even "outsiders" who may hold formal positions of authority within the institution in question or in related institutions.
Much of this is driven by the function of "mian" -- or "face." Loss of face is a BIG DEAL in China, and much more effort is put into avoiding losses of status than would be put into an equivalent enterprise or institutional setting in the West. There's a "negative feedback loop" between "face" and collective decision making, because loss of face tends to be a shared phenomenon -- if the leader of one engineering group makes a mistake, the whole group loses faces, and so do other engineering groups, for instance. Once that happens, the institution will "freeze up" while scapegoats are sought and a lot of effort is put into doubletalk and misdirection to try to blunt the impact of the status loss.
All of these phenomena have analogs in Western institutional settings, but they aren't as acute. There just isn't a "native Chinese" mode of "graceful failure" or "creative destruction" in situations where traditional Confucian values take precedence. And, in the post-Mao era, Chinese state enterprises are quintessentially Confucian institutions. So far more effort is put into protecting the established social hierarchy from the negative effects of failure than tends to be devoted to analogous tasks in Western institutions. All of which tends to result in VERY slow progress with VERY low risk tolerance.