Let me add to this business of man-rating and risk managment.
If the history of NASA manned spaceflight accidents is any guide, it would appear that the main risk to space travelers is not how one determines the reliabilty of the hardware or whether the hardware performs as advertised, but rather the managment of NASA.
Both shuttle accidents were caused by known problems which were ignored by naively overconfident managment. Poor systems engineering. The SRBs had engineering limits which were exceeded (low temperature), but they worked fine when you used them properly. The ET had foam-shedding problems from STS-1, which was a violation of requirements that debris not strike the TPS. Good systems engineering means you stop flying until you fix the problem. Bad systems engineering is when you keep flying because you've gotten away with it for a hundred flights and assume it's not a real problem.
Ares I will be under a lot of pressure to get the US back into manned spaceflight with a minimum of funding in a few years, and that pressure is what drives managment to take needless chances.
All rockets have engineering problems, but the risk to crews is not just technical hardware or software issues, it's also operational decisions made under pressure.
---------- Post added at 05:45 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:38 PM ----------
Disagree. You simply cannot engineer your way around bad systems engineering decisonmaking. If LRBs were safer than SRBs, than it would've been something else that eventually would've caused an accident. Or, given the greater perceived safety margin, the decision-makers would've taken even more chances.
Poor design + good systems engineering = slow launch rate and wasted money
(Poor design OR good design) + bad systems engineering = faster launch rate followed by a bad accident.
I am conflating the terms "systems engineering" with "managment", here. Although not exactly the same, systems engineering rigor is the direct responsibility of managment.
If the history of NASA manned spaceflight accidents is any guide, it would appear that the main risk to space travelers is not how one determines the reliabilty of the hardware or whether the hardware performs as advertised, but rather the managment of NASA.
Both shuttle accidents were caused by known problems which were ignored by naively overconfident managment. Poor systems engineering. The SRBs had engineering limits which were exceeded (low temperature), but they worked fine when you used them properly. The ET had foam-shedding problems from STS-1, which was a violation of requirements that debris not strike the TPS. Good systems engineering means you stop flying until you fix the problem. Bad systems engineering is when you keep flying because you've gotten away with it for a hundred flights and assume it's not a real problem.
Ares I will be under a lot of pressure to get the US back into manned spaceflight with a minimum of funding in a few years, and that pressure is what drives managment to take needless chances.
All rockets have engineering problems, but the risk to crews is not just technical hardware or software issues, it's also operational decisions made under pressure.
---------- Post added at 05:45 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:38 PM ----------
Yea, sure it was the management failure that ultimately contributed to the destruction of STS-51L, but if the system had been liquid fueled, the management failure might not have happened.
Disagree. You simply cannot engineer your way around bad systems engineering decisonmaking. If LRBs were safer than SRBs, than it would've been something else that eventually would've caused an accident. Or, given the greater perceived safety margin, the decision-makers would've taken even more chances.
Poor design + good systems engineering = slow launch rate and wasted money
(Poor design OR good design) + bad systems engineering = faster launch rate followed by a bad accident.
I am conflating the terms "systems engineering" with "managment", here. Although not exactly the same, systems engineering rigor is the direct responsibility of managment.
